The Coming Ground War

Open intel center Statfor's analysis seems reasonable:

Hezbollah's strategy appears to be threefold. First, force Israel into costly attacks against prepared fortifications. Second, draw Israeli troops as deeply into Lebanon as possible, forcing them to fight on extended supply lines. Third, move into an Iraqi-style insurgency from which Israel -- out of fear of a resumption of rocket attacks -- cannot withdraw, but which the Israelis also cannot endure because of extended long-term casualties. This appears to have been a carefully planned strategy, built around a threat to Israeli cities that Israel can't afford. The war has begun at Hezbollah's time and choosing. ...

Destruction of Hezbollah's infrastructure does not mean annihilation of the force. If Israel withdraws, Hezbollah or a successor organization will regroup. If Israel remains, it can wind up in the position the United States is in Iraq. This is exactly what Hezbollah wants. So, Israel can buy time, or Israel can occupy and pay the cost. One or the other.

This fills me with dread....

Comments

[Zathras]

Stratfor always assumes everyone has a "carefully planned strategy."

This may be a more dubious assumption in this case than in most others. Hezbollah has surely kept its membership busy building fortifications and training against an Israeli attack, and we can all be sure it has devoted great thought to the question of its leader's safety, against the possibility that he might want to start a war someday.

But beyond that, I doubt Hezbollah's leadership expected the course the war has taken to date. This doesn't mean all developments in it have been negative from its point of view. In particular, Israel's decisions to attribute responsibility for Hezbollah's breach of the peace to the nominal Lebanese government and attack many targets with no obvious connection to Hezbollah have given the terrorist group an opportunity to recoup what could have been a devastating blow to its standing within Lebanon. On the other hand, unless Israel's ability to identify and hit Hezbollah targets from the air is very much less than I think it is, Hezbollah probably underestimated the damage IDF aircraft could do to prepared positions. To date, nearly every force preparing to fight a modern air force has underestimated its capabilities.

As to next steps, it is hard to say. What Hezbollah is likely to try to do is control the agenda within the radical Arab community while appealing to people outside the Arab world to sympathize with the Lebanese Nasrallah has dragged into his war. Making this easier is the Bush administration's silence; it's easier to control an agenda if all you have to do is fill a vacuum. Making it harder, and notwithstanding the political benefits Israel's tactical decisions have thrown Hezbollah's way, is the international community's clear understanding of how this crisis started. Most nations have looked the other way for years as Iran and Syria have armed Hezbollah with many weapons that have only one use. After this crisis ends they will react to inevitable future attempts to rearm Hezbollah with terror weapons.

This of course could prompt Hezbollah to look into other kinds of terrorism, as it has done before. I'm not saying all the possibilities are good ones, only that Stratfor's attribution of deep strategic thinking to everyone is bound to be misleading in about 98% of all cases, including this one.

[Cal]

--"To date, nearly every force preparing to fight a modern air force has underestimated its capabilities."--

I find it difficult to believe that Hezbollah made this mistake. It wasn't that long ago that they fought the Israelis.

If anything the lesson seems to be the reverse: that modern air forces greatly overestimate the damage they can do. We were unable to knock out many Scuds in the 1st Gulf War, despite the fact that there was almost nowhere to hide in the open desert. We were also shocked at how much the Serbs were able to hide in the Kosovo war, and we had KLA spotters on the ground.