Anthony Cordesman has always struck me as one of the most thoughtful, hard-headed analysts on the counter-insurgency in Iraq. He never gets too heated, and seems to put a premium on these things called facts.
Anyway, Cordesman came out with a new report last week. A few things that caught my eye:
Water:
Sabotage and theft helped cripple many of the country’s 229 operating water plants by the spring of 2005, and some 90% of the municipalities in the country lacked working sewage processing plants, contaminating the main sources of water as they drained into the Tigris and Euphrates. The Iraqi Municipalities and Public Works Ministry calculated in April 2005 that it provide water to some 17 million Iraqis (70% of the population), and supplies were so bad that some 30% of the 17 million did not have access to drinkable water. Many projects had to be cancelled and $1billion of the $3.65 billion allocated in US aid had to be diverted to security needs. There were a total of 15 water project starts in 2004, but none were planned for 2005.
Insurgency infiltration of the government:
Like Vietnam, Iraq is a warning that hostile HUMINT sources are often pushed into providing data because of family ties, a fear of being on the losing side, direct and indirect threats, etc. In Iraq’s case, it seems likely that family, clan, and ethnic loyalties have made many supposedly loyal Iraqis become at least part time sources, and that US vetting will often be little more than either a review of past ties or checks on the validity of data being provided [...] US and other military operations. Dual loyalty and HUMINT penetration of Iraqi security and military forces may be the rule, rather than the exception.
How the counter-insurgency can be like the War on Drugs...
US and Iraqi efforts to thwart insurgent attacks – while tireless – are also sometimes hollow victories. As one US Marine specializing in counterinsurgency in Iraq recently noted, “Seizing the components of suicide bombs (or IED making material) is like making drug seizures, comforting, but ultimately pointless. There will always be more. Both sides are still escalating to nowhere.”
Fighting an insurgency is a balancing act. The goal is to neutralize as many fighters as possible--whether by killing, arresting, or dissuading them--while limiting the impact of that fight on non-combatants. After all, piss-off non-combatants and some portion will sign up to fight against you. (As I argued in the LAT last week, the Army hasn't focused sufficiently on the later part of that equation.) Anyway, Cordesman puts it's all in perspective. I'll leave him with the closing thought:
As similar US errors at the Abu Ghraib prison compound demonstrated all too clearly, Excessive force and interrogation methods quickly become counterproductive and self-defeating even if they produce short-term results. The political dimension and impact of military, security, and police operations is not one that either Coalition or Iraqi commanders and forces can afford to ignore, even in the heat of battle. The primary purpose of Iraqi operations is to reforge a nation; not defeat an enemy.
DateBook Notes
Posted by: Silvester | October 28, 2010 at 03:15 PM