Eric Umansky

U.S. military fears nerve gas in Fallujah (and why)

I'm watching CNN which is reporting that Marines surrounding the city have been issued gas masks, because "U.S.  intelligence officials believe there is a risk that insurgents in Fallujah have a small amount of nerve gas agent."

Geez, I wonder where the guerrillas might have picked that stuff up?

Oh wait, here's last Saturday's NYT (page 12):

Looters overran an Iraqi complex last year where a bunker holding old chemical weapons was sealed by United Nations monitors, American arms inspectors have reported.

[...]

Bunker 2 at Muthanna State Establishment, once Iraq's central chemical weapons production site, was put under the control of the United Nations in early 1991 after it was damaged by an American bomb in the Persian Gulf war. At the time, Iraq said 2,500 sarin-filled artillery rockets had been stored there.

One chemical weapons expert said even old, weakened nerve agents - in this case sarin - could be a threat to unprotected civilians.

P.S.  A sarin-filled shell hit a U.S. convoy back in May.  The stuff was apparently so old it didn't have much effect.

The 100,000-dead study: nearly useless—*except for Fallujah*

As my Slate sidekick Fred Kaplan has argued, the study suggesting 100,000 Iraqis dead during the war seems to be little more than a WAG. (The study is easy to read, just eight-pages long, and free, but registration required.)

One of the reasons is the neighborhoods the researchers sampled—the clusters—may not have been representative of Iraq as a whole. Just one cluster, in Fallujah, turned up about two-thirds of the violent deaths. That’s one bit (in a pile) of evidence that the study’s country-wide extrapolations are screwy. But isn’t it also suggestive of something else, namely that there have been a lot of civilian causalities in Fallujah?

Take a look at this chart from the study. The blue line, the one that’s spikes way up high, that’s Fallujah:

Notice how most have happened recently? Those are airstrikes, and another example of why they’re a bad way to fight an insurgency.

(Note, the survey was only done through Sept. 16., while there were daily airstrikes throughout Sept.)

About half of the violent deaths sampled in town were children, 15-years-old younger. (See Table 2.)

Bonus track from TP: Fubar in Fallujah IV

There wasn’t much fighting in Fallujah yesterday, but residents were still streaming out.
“It's the bombing,” said one local businessman told the NYT. “The Americans say they are attacking houses with Mr. Zarqawi's people in them, but the bombs destroy everything around the houses too."

Most of the strikes have been with 500-pound bombs--which are small in terms of airstrikes. But in any other context 500 lbs is enormous and no matter how accurate the U.S. strikes are, or how good the intel is (and I suspect typically it isn't), you're still prone damaging the neighbors. That's bad--especially in a guerrilla war.

Blind in Fallujah III

TNR's Spencer Ackerman writes about a concern that I've also harped on: How do we know what we're hitting in Fallujah? And how wise is it to continue the strikes give the evidence that even ‘successful’ are hitting civilians too? (We both also quoted the sage John Paul Vann.)

Spencer thinks the strikes are counter-productive. I tend to agree--since you're enraging the whole population, and not just in Fallujah. Especially since the U.S.'s intel in Iraq has on average been on horrible (not enough translators, cultural knowledge, or reliable allies). But Spencer also argues that the strikes will drive the foreign and local insurgents together. And I'm not so sure about that--especially if the U.S. is careful to distinguish.

Imagine if you were a first-time and a bunch of accomplices are first-time bank robbers, holed up in a bank. One of your accomplices is a Natural Born Killer type, the one the cops are really after. What were to happen if cops started firing and said they'd stop if the NBK gives up or you toss him out. You can go free. Might that cause some tension?

It’s a nasty tactic—and the U.S. dismissive attitude towards civilian casualties makes it worse. I also don’t think it will work in the end, but I don’t know—and it might help widen the rift we want.

Another reason to hold-off attacking Fallujah

As TNR's Spencer Ackerman notices, it could end up driving locals back together with foreign fighters--just as a rift is growing between them.

Delaying the Iraq offensive: Such a bad thing?

People are huffing and puffing about administration officials admission that they're going to hold off offensives to retake big rebel cities until after the U.S. elections.

And yes, I get it, military and strategic decisions shouldn't be driven by Bush's job review machinations.
But isn't it possible that delaying a big offensive is the right choice, in spite of the selfish, myopic motivations?

After all, there are ongoing peace talks in Fallujah. And the U.S. may even support them. Just because Bush has his small reasons for letting them continue, doesn't mean they're bad.

Quick, call Centcom: Cheney knows where Zarqawi is!

Our Vice Prez, last night:

"Let's look at what we know about Mr. Zarqawi. We know that when we went into Afghanistan that he then migrated to Baghdad. He set up shop in Baghdad, where he oversaw the poisons facility up at Khurmal, where the terrorists were developing ricin and other deadly substances to use.

We know he's still in Baghdad today. He is responsible for most of the major car bombings that have killed or maimed thousands of people. He's the one you will see on the evening news beheading hostages.

He is, without question, a bad guy. He is, without question, a terrorist. He was, in fact, in Baghdad before the war, and he's in Baghdad now after the war."

Now, forget about Cheney's risible ricin comment. The "facility," such as it was, was in the Kurdish-controlled north.

But, Zarqawi is "now in Baghdad"? I thought we were sure he's in Fallujah. Or wait, is it that we have no idea?

"Worst counterinsurgency effort I have seen in 40 years..."

Apparently, I'm not the only one who thinks the airstrikes around Fallujah and elsewhere have at least the potential to be counterproductive. One "U.S. official who previously served in the military," told U.S. New & World Report, that the strikes are:

"The the dumbest possible thing anybody could ever dream up. The Pentagon] has this leadership that believes precision munitions are manna from heaven. They do not understand what is happening. This is the worst counterinsurgency effort I have seen in 40 years."

I've spoken to two maverick Marines generals about this. Their responses in a moment.

Negotiations in Fallujah

Apparently with the U.S. excluded. From IWPR's
Iraqi Press Monitor:

FALLUJANS LAY DOWN CONDITIONS FOR PEACE

(al-Sabah al-Jadeed) - Negotiators on behalf of Fallujah residents continued meetings with government officials aimed at ending the city's crisis. The delegation headed by Sheikh Khalid Mahmood al-Jumaili, imam of a mosque in Falluja, went to Baghdad to talk about the residents' requests. Fallujans want US forces barred from the city as a condition of handing over their weapons and ending military operations against the Americans. The Fallujans also asked for compensation to be paid to people affected by the recent US bombardment. The delegation expressed optimism over solving the crisis peacefully.
(Al-Sabah al-Jadeed is an independent daily paper.)

I wonder if the U.S. would agree to that. (Honestly.)

A rare view from *inside* Fallujah

A few months ago, I kicked around the (rather obvious) notion that reporters who speak the language and are knowledgable about a cultural have a much better chance of seeing what's really going. (Mr. Shrill dinged me for saying that it was still OK for reporters who don't speak the language to head wherever. But whatever, I like going to interesting places. Moving on...)

The invaluable IWPR has a dispatch from an Iraqi journalist it's training. The guy reported from inside Fallujah--and assuming his reporting is accurate, the trainee has far more information than do the dispatches from all the high-falutin' U.S. papers (or probably anyone else for that matter.

A few lines:

Divided ideologically, the various religious [insurgent] groups argue over issues ranging from the proper way to finance their respective movements to the treatment of foreign and Iraqi captives.

[...]

According to Fallujans, the Black Banners – the most feared of the town’s insurgents – are commanded by Omar al-Hadid, an Iraqi said to be affiliated with the al-Qaeda leader Osama Bin Laden. The Black Banners represent the bulk of the Syrian and other foreign fighters based in town, residents say, and are the most puritan of the groups.

They reportedly ban anything from cigarettes to popular music cassettes. Their reputation for unpredictable behaviour means that in the neighbourhoods where their checkpoints predominate, few people venture out of doors.

But the Black Banners compensate for the economic hardships brought by their presence. They readily pay several times the value of anything they commandeer, drawing on apparently ample funds.

The story quotes one man--an arms smuggler--who said he was confronted by the Black Banners for lighting up a cigarette.

"Why are you smoking here? We will kill you. Give those here," said the insurgent, in what Adnan said was a Syrian accent. The Black Banners had previously announced that they considered tobacco to be “haram”, or religiously forbidden.

But after seizing the pack, the fighter handed him a ten-dollar bill as compensation. "Take this for your family," he said.

[...]

And then there's this:

Like many in Fallujah, a policeman expressed resentment at insurgents who are capable of calling someone a spy merely for talking with people from out of town or trying to make a call on a satellite phone.

"I hate them,” he said. “The mujahideen can decide 'you're a good man', or 'you're a spy.' If it's 'you're a spy', then you're finished."

Others resent the mujahideen’s contempt for anyone who chooses not to carry arms.

"When I see them, I say 'Welcome! Welcome mujahideen! God grant you victory!' But in my heart I curse them," said one merchant.

The peice doesn't have any mention of Zarqawi. Read into that what you want, but I take it as another hint that Zarqawi isn't the mastermind the U.S. makes him out to be.