Blackwater in hot water

Blackwater, the security company that protects many U.S. diplomats among others, has just had its license suspended by the Iraqi government after shots from one of their convoys apparently killed eight Iraqis.

I've long thought that the situation of security contractors in Iraq--lots of gun, and almost no accountability--is a recipe for disaster. As contractors and bodyguards, their priorities are the exact opposite of smart counter-insurgency strategies. Rather than working to protect the population, the contractors Job #1, 2, and 3 is to protect their clients. They don't get paid to protect the local population. And then, as I mentioned, there's the near total lack of accountability: The contractors are exempt from Iraqi laws (thanks to Mr. Bremer), nor are they subject to the U.S. military code of justice. They operate in a big old grey area. So can it be a surprise when "incidents" like this happen?

Comments

[Zathras]

I'm not sure security contractors are exempt from Iraqi law in the way they were during the CPA's tenure as the de facto government. Blackwater and other such companies operate under formal license from the Iraqi Ministry of Interior, as I understand it, which evidently doesn't mean Iraqi regulation of its procedures but does mean Iraqis have a "go-no go" switch as to whether a contractor can operate in the country. So the area contractors operate in is still gray, but it's a different shade of grey than it was some years ago.

It's a no-win situation, really. A contractor's employees engages gunmen attacking a convoy of government officials and civilians are killed -- bad counterinsurgency. A contractor's employees doesn't engage gunmen attacking a convoy, and government officials are killed or kidnapped -- bad counterinsurgency. And I udnerstand the point about lack of accountability, but that's really more important for us than it is for the Iraqis. If Iraqi civilians get killed in a shootout, whether the people pulling the trigger are brought to trial and given some nominal punishment isn't going to matter that much to people over there.

[Eric Umansky]

The legal situation might different now. I just don't know. But as I practical matter, I think there's still almost no accountability for contractors. My understanding is that some of the security companies just ignore the "requirement" to register with the Iraqi government. In any case, I'm learn we'll learn plenty in the coming days about the exact legal landscape for contractors.

[Zathras]

As I say, I understand accountability and its importance for Americans. I really don't want someone who killed a guy with impunity in some foreign country running around later in this one.

But what about for Iraqis? Frankly, you have to wonder how much good our traditional means of producing accountability do us over there. In this particular incident, what we would consider a fair trial would need a year or more just to collect the evidence, and even after that dispelling reasonable doubt as to who shot whom would be next to impossible. And are military criminal proceedings any better than their civilian counterparts? Not so you could tell from the proceedings that followed Abu Ghraib and Haditha.

So what is the purpose of "accountability"? It's purpose for us I understand; it's utility in the present conflict in Iraq is a lot less clear to me.

[Eric Umansky]

I actually think there is a plenty of potential ulitility in accountability. Most importantly, if some contractors had previously faced trial for going overboard then contractors now might be just a tad more careful about/when firing off rounds. And you don't think that would benefit the U.S. or Iraq?

[Zathras]

It might. Or it just might have made it harder and more expensive for the agencies and private companies working in Iraq to get security services.

Now, this discussion presumes a level of trigger-happiness among Blackwater types in Iraq, a presumption that may or may not be justified even in this individual case. But leaving that aside for now, it certainly makes sense to think about what the rules of the game need to be in future conflicts where private security contractors are concerned. It might have helped us had this been done back in 2002, before the invasion. I just don't see how much good it does us in Iraq right now. We don't get to do the first few years of this war over again.

[Eric Umansky]

"This discussion presumes a level of trigger-happiness among Blackwater types in Iraq." I don't think on my part.

My point isn't that security contractors in Iraq are predisposed to be trigger happy. I'm just saying that they're human--and humans respond to incentives. And for the past few years the incentives for contractors have been weighted, from a national security perspective, outta whack.

These guys just want to protect their clients. I have no doubt about that. That's not the point.

[Zathras]

So to what are you comparing contractors' "incentives"?

[Zathras]

Another data point, with respect to Blackwater specifically, via TPM: http://www.tpmmuckraker.com/archives/004230.php

[dogstevennig]

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