Go figure, but the WSJ's page editorial has a solid piece explaining the conflict. I'm reprinting it in full below. (Note to WSJ lawyers: you contact me here.)
Pity the poor East Timorese. Four years after independence, the country would have plunged headfirst into civil war in recent weeks were it not for a rapid deployment of Antipodean and Malaysian troops, plus the assumption of emergency powers by President Xanana Gusmao on Tuesday. That's a stark change of fortune for a nation once hailed as one of the United Nations' greatest triumphs. It is also a good reason to re-examine what has gone so very wrong.
The recent trouble, which echoes the bloody events of 1999, was reportedly sparked by the dismissal of 594 troops from East Timor's miniscule military. Those fired hailed mostly from the country's western region. They claimed that the military's top brass, most of whom hail from the east, had discriminated against them.
Given that regional divides haven't historically played much of a role in East Timorese society, that sounds like a thin excuse for mob violence. The troops were more likely frustrated about their desperate economic circumstances, not to mention the military's diminished role under the ruling Fretilin government, which founded a paramilitary group within the police force.
The former concern could have been more deftly handled by Dili's policy makers, though they admittedly inherited a mess. Lisbon, which ruled Timor for three centuries, left the country in tatters, and Jakarta, which occupied it from 1975-1999, did only marginally better. The 2003 resolution of a maritime dispute with Australia boded better. That allowed the new country to tap vast oil and gas revenues in the Timor Sea. Given where commodity prices have gone over the past four years, the timing couldn't have been better. Last year, the East Timor government posted a budget surplus and has started to stash a slug of the windfall into a Norway-style Petroleum Fund in an effort to stave off Dutch disease.
But despite this largesse, East Timor's impoverished citizenry didn't see much change. Capital expenditure, which composes a significant proportion of GDP, declined in the first few years of Fretilin's rule, according to the International Monetary Fund. Infrastructure repairs were slow, and the pace of foreign investment even slower. Economic growth, at around 2%, remained sluggish. Meanwhile, in an ironic peace dividend in the predominantly Catholic country, the birth rate spiked, creating an urgent need for the government to kickstart the economy.
Dili's policy makers simply weren't up to the task. Most of the government elite, including Prime Minister Mari Alkatiri, had spent the bulk of their adult lives in exile or actively fighting a guerrilla war against Indonesia, not learning the intricacies of governing. As author Paul Cleary explains in an article on a nearby page, Mr. Alkatiri surrounded himself with a group of former exiles, dubbed the "Mozambique clique," who did little to promote debate and thoughtful policy making within the new administration. The mid-level bureaucracy was slow to implement the ministers' policies and inexperienced.
Instead of tapping foreign advice and goodwill early on to plug these holes, Mr. Alkatiri entered into a kind of siege mindset, centralizing power and implementing a series of decisions that alienated wide swathes of his political base. Most unpopular was the decision to make Portuguese -- a language of the exiles, but not of the nation -- the official language. Fretilin also adopted the national flag as its party symbol, a not-so-subtle claim to absolute power. Even the diplomatic World Bank noted that "Less centralization in decision-making, accompanied by effective monitoring and safeguards, would lead to stronger performance." Translation: The current setup just isn't working.
Perhaps this shouldn't come as a great surprise. Led by Mr. Alkatiri, Fretilin steamed to an overwhelming victory in the 2002 election, thanks to his independence-fighter credentials and the party's superior organizational skills. Since then, Fretilin has occupied 55 of 88 seats in the East Timorese parliament. Given the weakness of the presidency, that gave Mr. Alkatiri and his advisers a fairly free hand.
Mr. Gusmao's declaration on Tuesday that he'd taken control of the military signals a welcome correction to this power imbalance. Since he's commander in chief, the action seems legal, too. Yesterday, calm prevailed in the capital, implying that the president wields a great deal of moral authority.
But the authority of one man is rarely enough to build a nation with as violent a history as East Timor, nor to hold it physically together in its current state. Thankfully, President Gusmao called Canberra for help when mobs ran out of control. That was a good idea. It was encouraging, too, to see New Zealand and Malaysia contribute forces.
After calm has been restored, the East Timorese government might want to think about how useful it is to keep an army in place that has so little to do. Indonesia, especially under the leadership of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, is now a relatively benign neighbor (and has stayed admirably out of the current conflict), and it is in Australia's interests to keep the country stable. It's fine if Dili wants to keep a small, professional fighting force, but it needs to define the group's role clearly.
Next year is an election year in East Timor. If Fretilin's performance is anything to go by, it's time for a change. But it's up to the East Timorese to make that call at the ballot box.
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