That's how one U.S. officer in Ramadi described the insurgency there. Time magazine's Michael Ware--who's done some of the best reporting on the insurgency--hung out with GIs for a week in Ramadi and describes something like an urban Hamburger Hill--heavy fighting, heavy losses, all to an unclear end. Actually, the goal might, just might, be achievable if the U.S. troops weren't still playing whack-a-mole:
The bigger problem, though, is one that few in the military command want to hear: there aren't enough troops to do the job. "There's a realization, as every military commander knows, that you cannot be strong everywhere," says Gronski of Ramadi. "In the outlying areas, we think in terms of an economy of force where we are willing to accept risk by not placing as many troops."
But while Gronski says his fighting strength is "appropriate," other commanders bristle at the limitations. "I can't believe it each time the Secretary of Defense talks about reducing force," says a senior U.S. officer. War planners in Iraq say just getting a handle on Ramadi demands three times as many soldiers as are there now. Several U.S. commanders say they won't ask superiors for more troops or plan large-scale operations because doing so would expose problems in the U.S.'s strategy that no one wants to acknowledge. "It's what I call the Big Lie," a high-ranking U.S. commander told TIME.
I know: Our force in Iraq is about as big as it can be. We don't have many more troops to send. I'm not saying I have answers...just questions.
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