Welcome to the Insurgency: The "Desert Protectors"

I've harped again and again about the U.S.'s lack of intel in Iraq, a problem driven by our lack of knowledge (cultural, linguistic, etc.). I don't think that's an easy thing to solve. In fact, as Tony Cordesman argues, it probably isn't completely "solvable." It's one of the problems inherent to an occupation. You can do a better job or worse with intel (for better see Israel in the West Bank and Gaza). But what you really need to do is develop local institutions (yes that will take years to accomplish, as would/will developing a solid knowledge base).   In the meantime, here's   the cost of doing business now:

AL ASAD, Iraq - On the final day of a town-to-town military sweep in November along the Euphrates River, hundreds of men in Ar Rabit, a farming village, were rousted from their homes by American and Iraqi troops and shepherded into long rows on a harvested cornfield.

With the help of a group of locally recruited informants, most with their faces concealed by balaclavas and scarves, the troops pulled 12 suspected insurgents from the lineup, bound them in handcuffs and blindfolds, and took them away.

American military commanders have repeatedly hailed the contributions of the informant group, called the Desert Protectors, saying their help in recent weeks demonstrates the increasing willingness of local residents to cooperate in fighting guerrillas on Iraq's fiercely independent western fringe....

One man, his face hidden, identified suspected insurgents in lineups by flashing a thumbs-down sign over their heads, providing the basis for the detentions of most of the 96 suspects captured along the northern side of the river, according to Army and Marine officials. Those included the 12 in Ar Rabit on Nov. 21.

One member of the Army's Tactical Human Intelligence Team, which chaperoned the informants during the sweep on the north side of the river, said his unit had felt it necessary to rein in the informants.

"They were fingering, like, 25, 30 at a time," recalled the soldier, Special Agent Timothy Price. "We said: 'No way. We need to have evidence.' They want to get everyone who's not their tribe."...

In fact, our understanding seems to be so sketchy forget about the suspects we're not even sure who makes up the celebrated informants' unit:

The composition of the Desert Protectors is more complicated than the military account suggests. While officers and troops who work closely with the informants said the group was made up of Abu Mahals [a now-friendly tribe], several Desert Protectors said the membership was more varied, and even included Salmanis. The membership reflects a complex arrangement of new alliances that cut across tribal lines.

"We haven't really focused on figuring them out," a member of the Army's interrogation team said at a desert holding camp north of the Euphrates. Motioning toward a clump of detainees squatting on the sand, he added, "We've focused on figuring everyone else out."

By the way, the Marine officers here clearly seem to be trying their best to be fair and not piss off locals. But it's tough going when you're nearly operating blind:

Military officers said that the informants were involved only in the first wave of field screening and that other evidence was also considered, including whether a suspect's name appeared on the military's lists of known insurgents.

Each case was further screened by intelligence experts and lawyers at military bases, they said, and more than 60 percent of the initial detainees were released.

Asked whether the American and Iraqi leadership might be losing potential allies by subjecting possibly innocent people to this harsh process, Colonel Davis replied: "Welcome to insurgency. You will find no finality except for death on this battlefield. There are no absolutes."

Comments

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so, a shorthand version of this is that our military doesn't know who it is fighting (insurgents, foreign fighters or terrorists, or what percentage makes up each part)

nor does the military know everyone whom it is allied with, like these Desert Protectors?

The mystery allies aspect is troubling because there have been reports of Our guys doing the bidding of the Shia when the Shia want to settle grudges. Not good. It makes the process of stabalizing Iraq a mess wrapped in a conundrum-- or to be brusque, wrapped in an evolving clusterf-ck.
Hope I'm wrong in that reading though.