A Clarification on Iraqi Army Training
I think some commentators and linkers misunderstood my (probably poorly expressed) post on training the Iraqi army.
Training the Iraqi army is important and necessary; I just don't think it's sufficient or the Holy Grail that many assume/assert it to be.
You can train Iraqi forces all you want, but what you ultimately need in addition to capability is will. That is, you need Iraqi troops willing to fight and die for the Iraqi government. Insurgents are willing to do that for their cause. As have some Shiite militia and Kurdish peshmerga. But how about Iraqi government troops? Who, on balance, are they loyal to?
I don't know the answer. And I suspect nobody here, or in the Green Zone, does either.
UPDATE: I just heard James Fallows, whose article prompted this thread--asked the loyalty question. His answer: More training; that is, train the forces enough and they will move past their "primitive identifications." (Fallows words; my memory. No transcript yet.) It's that kind of outlook, of training itself as the ultimate and implicit cure-all, that I'm skeptical of.
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