The Entity Formerly Known as Iraq

When I first heard Peter Galbraith's argument for breaking up Iraq, oh say, two years ago I thought it bordered on loopy. (My auto-rejoinder was, "Why what about Baghdad?") But each time I read of one Galbraith's big takeouts, I become increasingly sympathetic to his argument that there is no "Iraq" and that acknowledging that offers one of best chances for some semblance of stability. His latest piece in the NYRB offers this tidbit:

The Iraqi army nominally has 115 battalions, or 80,000 troops. This figure, often cited by those who see the Iraq occupation as a success, corresponds only to the number of troops listed on the military payroll. However, when the Ministry of Defense decided to supervise the payment of salaries, a third of the payroll was returned. (In Iraq's all-cash economy, commanders receive a lump sum for the troops under their command; this acts as an incentive for them to maintain ghost soldiers on the payroll.) One senior official estimated that barely half the nominal army actually exists...

The problems with the Iraqi army go beyond the many opportunities for corruption. In this deeply divided country, people are loyal to their community but not to Iraq, and the army reflects these divisions. Of the 115 army battalions, sixty are made up of Shiites and located in southern Iraq, forty-five are Sunni Arab and stationed in the Sunni governorates, and nine are Kurdish peshmerga, although they are officially described as the part of the Iraqi army stationed in Kurdistan. There is exactly one mixed battalion (with troops contributed from the armed forces of the main political parties) and it is in Baghdad.

Galbraith is apparently not the most independent observer. But if he's right about there being only one mixed battalion, that suggests "Iraq," as a concept, is in big big trouble.  (I will say though that I'm curious to know more about the 45 Sunni battalions.)  The silver lining is that, according to Galbraith, is that the proposed constitution, which doesn't try to force One Iraq, represents a way out. 

I'm a bit like a ping-pong ball on all this--back and forth, back and forth. I'd be interested to know what other people, particularly more informed ones, think.

P.S. A few weeks ago, I took some swipes at proposed strategies for Iraq that didn't particularly account for, oh say, the realities of Iraq. The much-discussed "oil-spot" strategy fits into that model. It makes all the sense in the world as a general counter-insurgency strategy, and happens to be completely unrealistic for Iraq. Namely, it's focused on the actions of U.S. forces--they should consolidate, they move to a few urban areas, etc. The problem is that U.S. forces have neither sufficient  numbers nor, more crucially,  sufficient intel to root out insurgents even in targeted "safe-havens." 

Consider the road to the airport. A fabulous  amount of resources have been poured into trying to secure it. And safe is not what anybody would call it. (The "world's most dangerous road" is a more common  description.)

It's not  simply a question of numbers of troops or consolidating them.   GIs--who usually don't speak the language and don't have cultural knowledge--are often operating  blind, relying on dubious sources who can increase friction with locals.  It's not the soldiers' fault. As everybody recognizes what the  U.S.  needs are Iraqi soldiers willing to do the job. In his oil-spot strategy Andrew Krepinevich, some sensible but narrow suggestions:

To start, U.S. and coalition forces must do much more to aid and develop the capabilities of their Iraqi counterparts in counterinsurgency operations: training them, embedding U.S. soldiers and marines in Iraqi units, and providing U.S. quick-reaction forces to support the Iraqis, if needed. The embedding effort should be far more extensive than currently planned, and some of the U.S. Army's best soldiers should be assigned to this initiative. It would involve some risk, since embedded U.S. personnel are likely to suffer more casualties than they would in all-U.S. units. But the payoff would be high as well.

Again, totally sensible and totally generic.  What Krepinevich doesn't acknowledge is what Galbraith implictly focuses on: "Train" Iraqis all you want. But unless they're willing to fight as Iraqis--rather than as Shiites or Kurds--exactly what good are you doing? And  maybe the best thing you can do is try to go with the flow and no longer try to fight the reality of where loyalties really lie. 

Comments

[SteveH]

I have no special knowledge to add, but have long suspected that the best case scenario for Iraq involves semi-autonomous regions. That may be a prelude to complete breakup, but that's about it for good news. The Kurds are not going to let southern Shiites run their provinces, but that's where the bulk of the population lies. The Kurds may settle for de facto sovereignity now, and get full-fledged later. The Shiites can wait, and the Sunnis are going to be unhappy no matter what.

[Scott A. Lawrence]

If the Sunnis would be unhappy about Kurdish sovereignty, the Turks would be even more upset--perhaps upset enough to invade.

[Solomon]

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