Eric Umansky

QED: Rove leaked classified info

Forget for a moment whether Rove's chatting about breaks the law about outing an agent. Forget even the enticing possibility he perjured himself. Those are both still  hypotheticals. What isn't  a hypothetical is that  Rove  leaked classified info and that  is, what's the word, illegal. Over to David Corn, who links to a letter the CIA sent Rep. John Conyers:

In it, [the CIA]  told Conyers that the CIA on July 30, 2003--two weeks after the Plame/CIA leak first appeared in Bob Novak's column--"reported to the Criminal Division of DoJ a possible violation of criminal law concerning the unauthorized disclosure of classified information." Once more, here is proof that Valerie Wilson's employment status at the CIA was classified information. (Under U.S. law, the CIA does get to say what is and is not classified.) Which means that when Karl Rove and Scooter Libby told at least two reporters (Novak and Time's Matt Cooper) that Joseph Wilson's wife worked at the CIA they were disclosing classified information. Case closed.

Now, let's recall what Matt Cooper told the grand jury about his chat with Rove:

    As for Wilson's wife, I told the grand jury I was certain that Rove never used her name and that, indeed, I did not learn her name until the following week, when I either saw it in Robert Novak's column or Googled her, I can't recall which. Rove did, however, clearly indicate that she worked at the "agency"--by that, I told the grand jury, I inferred that he obviously meant the CIA and not, say, the Environmental Protection Agency. Rove added that she worked on "WMD" (the abbreviation for weapons of mass destruction) issues and that she was responsible for sending Wilson. This was the first time I had heard anything about Wilson's wife.

So, Plame's status was classified. Rove blabbed about it to a reporter (in the course of making a second-grade level argument to debunk a White House critic). I'm not saying Rove should be indicted--that's for prosecutors to decide--but what exactly is his boss's argument for keeping Turd Blossom on staff?

Re-envisioning Iraq's Reconstruction

A Knight Ridder story about infrastructure in Baghdad gives another glimpse of the pitfalls of   the U.S.'s top-down  big (American) contractor approach:

With about $2 billion already invested, Baghdad should be sparkling, said its mayor, Alaa Mahmoud al Timimi. He hasn't been consulted on American projects, besides signatures for completed developments, and has threatened to resign if he doesn't get a larger budget to solve his city's problems. The $85 million he was allocated can't keep up with the city of 6.5 million, he said.

He's already playing catch-up. Over 12 years the city was allocated about $3 per person per year, he said.

"Baghdad is an ignored city," said Timimi, who's a civil engineer. "The people, they blame me. I need money to rebuild the capacity of water (supply) and ... (for) sewage, garbage collection, power."

Electricity lines are tangled above the streets like strands of spaghetti, supply machinery dates to 1958 and fuse boxes have been ripped from the walls in electricity stations.

"It's too slow. If I had $2 billion I would have done three to five times more," Timimi said. "The Americans told me this is our money and we will spend it towards our plans. They do it their way."

As the piece mentions, there's plenty of blame to go around--Saddam, current government corruption, etc. But the U.S.'s knee-jerk  top-down non-local approach to reconstruction has hurt it. I don't have the time to get into the details at the  moment, but the suffice it to say that I agree with Anthony Cordesman's assessment, reconstruction is the "forgotten dimension of the war." He went on to say:

While there were many people in individual project areas many significant contributions—and often as considerable personal risk—I saw no picture that the U.S. has a meaning plan for using the aid money it is providing, that the system is improved or become more efficient, that it is becoming more secure or less corrupt, and that we have any idea what we as a nation are doing to solve the economic and security problems of Iraqis.

There is another way--or at least an opportunity to change our emphasis on reconstruction: the Iraqification strategy.  I'm not saying the U.S. should simply hand over billions to Baghdad and call it  day. But giving Iraqis control of the purse-strings should be  a priority.

Should there be checks to guard against corruption? Yes. Will there be plenty of  corruption anyway? Yes. That's  part of the cost of the strategy. But the potential  gains are also big. Consider the former insurgent stronghold  of Qabr Abed, where no GI has been killed for five months. The military there has capped the rebellion by being deeply engaged, doing things like creating a  police force staffed by residents, and... engaging in grassroots reconstruction (or what on a bad day might be called bribes):

The American soldiers helped empower the mayor by funneling some reconstruction contracts through him, including $400,000 for a jobs program and $200,000 for a new fire station.

"We pump dollars through him as one way to give him leverage," said Maj. Tim Vidra, the battalion's departing civil affairs officer. After the mayor threatened to withhold money for jobs from neighborhoods harboring makers of roadside bombs, the bombings stopped, Major Vidra said.

This approach has complications: American officers suspect that some money was siphoned off. American officers have not confronted the mayor about their suspicions, partly out of fear of muddling a relationship with someone crucial to restoring stability in this area. "This isn't Mayberry," Colonel McCaffrey said. "There are different cultural norms here. It doesn't make it right or wrong; it just makes it reality."

Maybe I'm being too reductive or maybe I'm just ill-informed, but I see  parallels  with the World Bank-type follies of, say, a generation ago. Big, often bloated projects that aren't wrong in and of themselves but do poorly in opporunity cost terms. In Iraq, some big engineering projects are no doubt needed and enormously helpful. Build those. But let's also remember the potential massive benefits of something more modest: involving Iraqis and then letting them decide what needs fixing and how to do it.*

* I plan on making some actual phone calls about this, including to development specialsts who have experience with, you know, what actually works. In any case, I'd welcome any feedback or further thoughts.

 

Flashback: Tenet's 'Screw You' to the WH

Swopa and Josh Marshall both flag the following from a Wash Post piece about the White House's counter-attack against Joseph Wilson:

Behind the scenes, the White House responded with twin attacks: one on Wilson and the other on the CIA, which it wanted to take the blame for allowing the 16 words to have remained in Bush's speech. As part of this effort, then-national security adviser Stephen J. Hadley spoke with Tenet during the week about clearing up CIA responsibility for the 16 words, even though both knew the agency did not believe Iraq was seeking uranium from Niger, according to a person familiar with the conversation.

It reminded me of Tenet's actual "apology," which is something of a classic. Tenet takes the fall in the first paragraph, concluding it, "These 16 words should never have been included in the text written for the President." Then Tenet takes remaining dozen paragraphs to stick a shiv in the White House's back.  For instance:

In October, the Intelligence Community (IC) produced a classified, 90 page National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Iraq's WMD programs. There is a lengthy section in which most agencies of the Intelligence Community judged that Iraq was reconstituting its nuclear weapons program. Let me emphasize, the NIE's Key Judgments cited six reasons for this assessment; the African uranium issue was not one of them.

Or this:

An unclassified CIA White Paper in October made no mention of the issue, again because it was not fundamental to the judgment that Iraq was reconstituting its nuclear weapons program, and because we had questions about some of the reporting. For the same reasons, the subject was not included in many public speeches, Congressional testimony and the Secretary of State's United Nations presentation in early 2003.

This is mostly just a fun run down memory lane, but there's a media angle to this all. Reporters should stop being--or playing--stupid: Tenet's apology wasn't really one. To simply call it one--rather than give a nod to the fact that it was half-hearted at best (and  actually implicates the WH)--is...lame.

Freedom on the March (Saudi Arabia edition)

So a Saudi court has upheld the convinctions of three Saudi Arabian citizens who had the temerity to call for a constitutional monarchy, rather than the absolute rule currently enjoyed by the royal Saudi family.

For what it's worth, Condi has praised the jailed men, calling them "brave citizens." (Rice actually seems to be making a habit of smart/honest rhetoric--(toning down the North Korean tension, playing nice to Abbas, etc.)

A Not Very Peaceful Afghan Protest

It's not exactly freedom on the march:

BAGRAM, Afghanistan (AP) — Hundreds of protesters chanting "Die America!" and throwing stones tried to batter down a gate at the U.S. military's main Afghan base Tuesday, adding to anxieties in a country worried that fighting with insurgents could disrupt elections...

The demonstrators said they were angry that U.S. troops arrested the villagers late Monday without consulting local authorities.

"We have supported the Americans for years. We should be treated with dignity," said Shah Aghar, 35. "They are arresting our people without the permission of the government. They are breaking into our houses and offending the people. We are very angry."

The U.S. detention (and treatment) of Afghan detainees is one of those issues that doesn't exactly have tons of traction stateside. But not surprisingly it seems to be something of big deal   for Afghans. an  A few weeks ago, the WSJ mentioned:

The Karzai government wants custody over Afghans held by the U.S., and greater control over American military operations in the country. The Bush administration has rebuffed both requests. "Success depends on maintaining" Afghan goodwill, cautions Afghan Ambassador Said Tayeb Jawad.

I'm not convinced Afghans would get better treatment if they were being held by the Afghan government but I'm curious how the arrangement works now and whether their might be any ways to improve it--both from a P.R. perspective and a humanitarian one.  For instance, in Iraq, there's an (overworked) board of Americans and Iraqis who review detainee cases and can reccomend releasing prisoners. Does Afghanistan have a similar system?

Decontructing a Bogus Leak

ArmsControlWonk nails the NYT David Sanger, who hyped a story he knew was  shaky (or at least had evidence was shaky ), a week later was forced to row back a bit and flag what he had buried in the original piece, and now  nearly three months  later pens a Page One piece saying his sources were wrong and were passing along what normal people would call gossip.

That the NYT Page One'd that final story is admirable, though it would have been better if the piece also explained the role the Times played in hyping the bogus leak in the first place.

Anyway, it's not like the story was about an important topic with, say, major policy decisions hanging in the balance. It was just an article about one peaceful little country, with whom the U.S. has had no tension,  getting ready to explode a big freakin' bomb.

Behind the Attacks

Last night I tweaked the Wash Post for Page One'ing speculation that Osama himself was behind the recent attacks. Just FYI, yesterday's  NYT had the  opposite (and non-speculative take):
"MANY BOMBS BUT LINKS ARE UNCLEAR." Describing attacks from Bali to Casablanca to Madrid and London, the Times say:

to date, none have been traced to Osama bin Laden, the fugitive leader of Al Qaeda, or to other pivotal leaders of what American officials now call Al Qaeda central, to distinguish from its offshoots, admirers and those who its successes have simply inspired.

That's not sexy reporting--so it doesn't land on Page One. But it does have the benefit of being honest.

P.S. Now I'm really leaving... and will be back Tuesday.

But before I go...

I will say this Page One Wash Post piece  struck me as questionable:

LONDON, July 23 -- The back-to-back nature of the deadly attacks in Egypt and London, as well as similarities in the methods used, suggests that the al Qaeda leadership may have given the orders for both operations and is a clear sign that Osama bin Laden and his deputies remain in control of the network, according to interviews with counterterrorism analysts and government officials in Europe and the Middle East.

It's not that the thesis is wrong. Maybe  Osama is sending out detailed to-dos lists. I don't know--and neither the Post. The thesis is entirely based on speculation. How exactly is  "it clear" that Bin Laden is still in control? Consider this passage,  far down into the story:

Counterterrorism investigators and analysts said it was highly unlikely that the people who organized the July 7 London bombings were directly involved in the Sharm el-Sheikh attacks. But they predicted that both plots would eventually be traced directly to al Qaeda.

The honest headline would have been: "EXPERTS GUESS  AL QAEDA LEADERS ARE IN CONTROL AND ORDERED  LONDON, EGYPT BOMBINGS."

The Post does eventually made  a good observation, it's just a slightly more limited picture.  Investigators have found links between the attacks in Casablanca, the ones in Madrid, and a set of attacks in Saudi Arabia. Maybe London and Egypt will join that list. In any case, the first three connections do suggest that there seem to still be a cadre of global jihadists rather than the local franchisees model of AQ that has been in vogue.  That's worth knowing. 

AWOL Monday

I'll be conferencing. Back Tuesday.

Good Hint That Hersh Was On To Something

Hersh's "We Wus Robbing the Iraqi Elections" hasn't gotten that much attention. Partly, of course, it's been a big news week. Partly I suspect it's  because whatever the shenangins, it's not like our favored man--apparently Allawi--is now sitting in the prime minister's desk. (I get into the screwy cost-benefit ratio here.)  And then there's the little problem that Hersh seems to be largely peddling in second-hand info.

Look through the piece and you'll have trouble finding any quotes from people who were directly  involved in the actual operation. Instead, what we get is a lot of seemingly second-second accounts, from people who might not even be in the loop. For instance:

A Pentagon consultant who deals with the senior military leadership acknowledged that the American authorities in Iraq “did an operation” to try to influence the results of the election. “They had to,” he said. “They were trying to make a case that Allawi was popular, and he had no juice.” A government consultant with close ties to the Pentagon’s civilian leaders said, “We didn’t want to take a chance.”

I was informed by several former military and intelligence officials that the activities were kept, in part, “off the books”—they were conducted by retired C.I.A. officers and other non-government personnel, and used funds that were not necessarily appropriated by Congress.

But I actually think Hersh is on to something. Why? Because there's plenty of real smoke. I'm not talking about the charges of actual ballot-stuffing--Hersh  really doesn't have evidence that the U.S. was involved with that. He's basically just passing along rumors there.

But secretly funding our man Allawi, that's a different issue. It's the one I buy.  The regional  head of one U.S.-funding election NGO (N.D.I.) mentioned to Hersh that Allawi "had huge resources, although nothing was flowing through normal channels." That brought me back to this dropped-in-the-middle-of nowhere reference from a January Time piece about the then-impending elections:

And so, as Iraqis prepare to go to the polls, the candidate into whom Washington has poured its support is waging an all-out blitz to hang on to the job he calls "horrible." He's the most visible campaigner in Iraq, using the money and media access that accrue to an incumbent like any other savvy politician anywhere. He is all over the airwaves in everything from hourly ads on radio and government TV to a glowing seven-part series on "the man and his country" broadcast in prime time on the popular Dubai channel al-Arabiya.

Here's what I asked at the time: "Where's the money coming from?" Obviously, one possibility is that he was, ahem, borrowing from government coffers. I think Hersh has explained the other possibility.

P.S. Funny that Time just mentions off-handedly that Allawi was the candidate "into whom Washington has poured its support." Was this one of those no-so-secret secrets?

P.P.S. Here's the bigger potential scoop that Hersh, again, doesn't nail. But it's front page fodder for another day:

Former military and intelligence officials told me, the White House promulgated a highly classified Presidential “finding” authorizing the C.I.A. to provide money and other support covertly to political candidates in certain countries who, in the Administration’s view, were seeking to spread democracy. “The finding was general,” a recently retired high-level C.I.A. official told me. “But there’s no doubt that Baghdad was a stop on the way. The process is under the control of the C.I.A. and the Defense Department.”

So we're  now blessing other countries with this particular brand of democracy promotion? Who knew  when the president talked about "people yearning democracy" he would take such a...pro-active position. Of course, it's such a savvy position because allegations of American-funding are always so helpful for pro-democracy politicians.