First-rate analyst Anthony Cordesman has a new report about the state of Iraqi security forces. Despite his talking-head tendencies, Cordesman is the best source around for making such an assessment. He's honest, and he seems to be damn well-informed (not the least because he's actually traveled to Iraq repeatedly).
His take:
Iraqi military, security, and police forces have improved during the last year, but the total number of effective forces range from 7,000 to 11,000 rather than the 127,000 total being reported by the U.S. government and only a few battalion elements are capable of operating against insurgents without U.S. support.
With one section headlined, Denial as a Method of Counter-Insurgency Warfare, Cordesman writes of:
a failure to understand the strategic situation in Iraq and the realities of Iraqi politics. It is a failure at every level to prepare for a coordinated U.S. effort at nation building. It is a failure to react to the growing reality of the insurgency in Iraq and the need for Iraqi military and police forces that could be true partners in fighting that threat.
On the other hand, he sees:
[a] series of changes in the way that the U.S. is preparing forces that have taken place since the spring of 2004, and that may well correct these mistakes and create the kind of Iraqi forces that are vital to both Iraq’s future and any successful reductions in U.S. forces and U.S. withdrawals from Iraq. It is not clear that these steps can overcome the legacy of past neglect and failure, but they do offer serious hope that the administration, the U.S. Congress, and the U.S. military fully recognize and support the U.S. training mission and Iraq’s evolving military, security and police forces.
I have to run out, more on those changes--maybe--later.
