The recent intel bill tries address one of the key problems of our intel services: They've done a bad job of sharing information. How well it addresses that issue--by an attempt to consolidate power-- is open to debate.
But there's another major problem facing the CIA and others: a structural bias towards brown-nosing. Intel agencies have no independence; their heads serve at the pleasure of the president. And like any employees, it's always tempting to try to please your boss.
This could be addressed by, say, appointing intel chiefs for set terms. (Layman sugg: There could be guards against potential abuses of power by allowing Congress to "impeach" or deconfirm a head.) So how does the recent bill affect the independence of intel agencies? It dimishes it.
According to a piece stuffed in the Wash Post last week--yeah, I'm a slacker--the bill increases the president's power of intel agencies: "PRESIDENT GETS TO FILL RANKS OF NEW INTELLIGENCE SUPERSTRUCTURE." Rather than just appoint the head of the CIA, the president now gets to name the top four officials in the overall intel 'superstructure .' That'll sure get those officials calling 'em as they seem 'em.
